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Resumo
O Impacto da Europeização no Caminho da Croá-
cia para a Democracia
A futura perspectiva de integração na União 
Europeia (UE) colocou os países dos Balcãs num 
caminho claro para a democracia.
Este artigo incide na europeização, dinâmica 
própria da UE enquanto actor global, aplicada ao 
processo de transição pós comunista da Croácia. 
Procuram-se respostas sobre a forma como a euro-
peização tem vindo a afectar o processo de tran-
sição na Croácia. Analisa-se o processo de demo-
cratização na Croácia, tendo em conta aspectos 
políticos, institucionais, sociais e económicos. 
Apesar de elementos de complementaridade e 
resistência na relação entre a europeização e as 
políticas governamentais, verifi ca-se que esta tem 
vindo a ter um grande impacto no processo de 
decisão política na Croácia.
Abstract
Due to the perspective of future integration into the 
European Union (EU), the Balkans countries are set 
on a clear course towards democracy.
Europeanization as a particular dynamic related 
to the EU role as a global actor, applied to the 
Croatia post-communist transition, constitute the 
vector of analysis. This essay aims to address the 
simultaneously interconnected and heterogeneous 
responses of Croatia’s post-communist course of change 
to European integration. In this line of research, we 
search for answers to how Europeanization affected 
Croatia’s post-communist transition. This will be 
pursued through an analysis of the democratization 
course, mainly regarding political, institutional and 
social aspects, and economic integration. Despite 
elements of complementarity and resistance in 
the working relationship among Europeanization 
and Croatia government policies, which are highly 
debatable, we fi nd it has substantial implications on 
Croatia policy-making.
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Introduction
The end of the Cold War and the desegregation of the Soviet bloc allowed a 
redrawing of the political landscape in Southeast Europe, with the states formerly 
under the communist regime redesigning policies and goals. With varying degrees 
of intensity, these states have been experiencing the spread of democratic ideals and 
liberal economic principles, conveyed, among others, by international organizations, 
such as the European Union (EU). In this post-communist transition process, the 
Europeanization as a particular dynamic related to the EU role as a global actor, 
constitute the vector of analysis.
This essay aims to address the simultaneously interconnected and heterogeneous 
responses of Croatia’s post-communist course of change to regional process of 
European integration. In this line of research, we search for answers to how 
Europeanization works in the case of Croatia’s post-communist transition. This will 
be pursued through an analysis of the democratization course, mainly regarding 
political, institutional and social aspects, and economic integration. Despite elements 
of complementarity and resistance in the working relationship among the EU and 
Croatia’s, which are highly debatable, we fi nd they have substantial implications 
on Croatia policy-making.
Following this line of research, the fi rst part of this essay starts with the clarifi cation 
of the conceptual framework – Europeanization. We draw on this concept as we 
explore the Croatia transition course towards democracy, and investigate how 
this transition has been affected by the Europeanization. Second, we apply this 
framework to the Croatia integration course into the EU, examining the role of the 
EU in post-communist change, particularly regarding democratization and economic 
aspects. This analysis underlines internal factors that characterize Croatia’s evolution 
course, and external ones, whose infl uence in decision-making process has been 
determinant and evident at all levels. We conclude by tying up the post-communist 
transition in Croatia with the vector of analysis, identifying drivers for change and 
elements of hindrance in the process. Europeanization dynamics in a context of 
domestic reformulation constitute a new reality to Balkan states.
Europeanization: Framing the Concept
Integration into the EU as a fundamental expression of regionalization sets the 
context for the analysis of the EU infl uence in Croatia’s post-communist transition. 
The issue pertains, among other aspects, to whether Croatian negotiations towards 
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accession are carried out in a symmetrical manner rather than by the imposition of 
a strategic use of norms and conditionalities enforced for reasons of self-interest 
(see Hettne & Soderbaum, 2005: 538-9; Jorgensen, 2004: 48-50).
Europeanization as a concept implies, thus, the fulfi llment of membership criteria, 
which include meeting democratic standards such as the respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, along with economic indicators. 
It also means the 
“development of networks of interactions among domestic and supranational 
actors to initiate and unfold the decision making process during the input base” 
and the “gradual and differentiated diffusion-penetration of values, general 
norms, and specifi c decisions from European institutions into the domestic politics, 
that is, into the working domestic institutions, decision-making processes and 
domestic policies at different levels” (Morlino 2002: 237-260).
In this way, Europeanization requires the socialization and internalization of 
EU norms and procedures both within the Union and as a pre-condition for those 
states applying to join.
Therefore, through a focus on the promotion of stability through democratization, 
institution-building and civic participation, Europeanization is understood here as 
a process of
“construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs 
and norms which are fi rst defi ned and consolidated in the making of EU decisions 
and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political 
structures and public policies (Radaelli, 2000: 4).
It goes further than regionalization by implying a process of gradual socialization 
and internalization of political and economic policies along side security measures 
as understood by the EU, through for example legal, institutional and structural 
adjustment. This deepening process is embedded in the criteria for accession to the 
EU, as well as in its Neighborhood Policy (European Neighborhood Policy – ENP), 
as a mechanism of harmonization of practices that might facilitate cooperation 
between the EU, accession candidates and its wide neighboring area (stretching to 
the Mediterranean, and through the Middle East to the Caucasus).
Croatia has been going through the Europeanization process, adopting and 
getting adapted to the EU acquis communataire since Dayton Agreements. This process 
“externally driven, coercive and increasingly demanding” (Anastasakis, 2005: 70), 
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depends directly upon specifi c mechanisms and intervening confi ning conditions. 
In the short and medium-term, Europeanization may be linked with sacrifi ces and 
diffi cult socioeconomic and political choices for Croatia. But in the long run, it is 
identifi ed with modernization, development, stability, and a sense of security based 
on soft power and the benefi ts of cooperation and co-existence.
These developments are further analyzed in the section on Croatian policy 
dynamics, looking at the driving forces behind change and questioning a process 
where, in instances, intentions and decisions have not matched expectations.
Within the EU the goals of promoting and expanding democratic practices (as a 
fundamental dimension implied in the Europeanization process) have been clearly 
stated in the organization’s founding documents. Understanding democracy beyond 
the minimal defi nition of Schumpeter (1952), we add to the holding of free elections, 
good governance principles, particularly focusing on political accountability, 
ruling stability and civic participation, as fundamental elements in a democratic 
state. Economic development is also added to our analysis as a major EU goal. 
When looking at the Croatia case through this framing, a gradual maturation in 
the democratization of Croatia politics is noticeable, while acknowledging this as 
an arduous process still carrying many limitations, particularly regarding good 
governance principles and economic indicators.1 These issues are further analyzed 
in the section devoted to the internal factors where more efforts are needed to 
accomplish Croatia’s goal of integration in the EU.
Europeanization is internalized differently by the various states or national actors 
in the Western Balkans (WB), and its degree of success relies on their ability and 
willingness to change. Being a region of starkly contrasting levels of development, 
geographies, cultures, and strategic interests, the impact of Europe is different from 
state to state, resulting in diverse co-existing stages of association and integration 
with the EU. As it is stressed in the “Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans”, 
adopted by the European Council in June 2003,
“the pace of further movement of the WB countries towards the EU lies in their 
own hands and will depend on each country’s performance in implementing 
reforms, thus respecting the criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council 
of 1993 and the Stabilization and Association Process conditionality”.
Regarding Croatia’s case, we conclude that the country developed differently from 
the others Balkan countries. The combination of important structural preconditions 
 1 At this regard look to the data provided by the Freddom House report about Croatia democratic 
score. Freedom House – Nations in Transit – Croatia, 2007.
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and a reasonably sustainable economy with political and policy decisions brought 
progress, development and stability to the country. Furthermore, the provision 
of legislative and institutional templates, monitoring, and benchmarking: aid and 
technical assistance; advice and twinning; and fi nally, the prospect of membership 
the EU had and still have a major external impact on the domestic discourse and 
the internal governance of Croatia.
After analyzing Europeanization, the following section looks at Croatian policy 
dynamics towards accession to the EU, identifying how domestic policies have been 
constrained and enhanced by this process.
Croatia’s Policy Dynamics
Croatia was part of federal Yugoslavia before and after World War II. After its 
declaration of independence in June 1991, the country had to face a war with the 
troops from the remainder of Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia and with members of 
the ethnic Serb community inside Croatia itself. Therefore, we can argue that the 
country found itself fi ghting a defensive war on its territory at the same as it was 
undergoing three comprehensive transitions: from a constituent federal republic to a 
sovereign state; from an authoritarian one-party system to a multi-party democracy; 
from a central to a market economy.
The bid for independence was associated with the rise of nationalist forces whose 
ideology and political practice meant that the priority given to nation-building 
turned out to be at odds with the process of European integration.
After the war, and especially after the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995, Croatia 
tried to make a quick transition, being one of its priorities to distance itself from the 
negative label of “Balkan country”. But it was included in the same international 
confl ict management framework for the Balkans.
During the 1990’s, Croatia expended efforts in different areas connected with 
the realization of social and economic development. But, this was not an easy path. 
Rather, it was a constant struggle to overcome a myriad of inherited international 
and domestic problems along with continuously delicate relationships among 
members of the ruling coalition. International relations were at a rudimentary level 
and Croatia was constantly on the defensive. International semi-isolation, although 
never proclaimed, kept Croatia out of the European mainstream. Non membership 
in the key security and economic institutions like North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) produced the situation of a gray 
zone. Unresolved problems with neighboring countries and the slowness in resolving 
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these issues, along with the constant concern with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and 
its internal problems, kept Croatian politics anchored to the pandemonium in BiH. 
The political system, although semi-presidential in theory, was purely presidential 
in practice. The Parliament and the government were just operational tools in the 
hands of the President who directly jeopardized the functioning of the already fragile 
democratic institutions.2 The economic system was heavily damaged by the war 
and additionally shaken with problematic privatization and omnipresent corruption. 
However, despite some unresolved problems, the results of Croatian government 
were satisfactory, and provide a fi rm basis for further improvement.
After the last occupied territories were effectively brought under Croatian rule 
in 1998 (with the successful reintegration of formerly occupied Eastern Slavonia), 
and the threat of war had diminished, policy had to change. The turning point came 
with the formation of a new political consensus within Croatia, with a genuine 
will on the part of the vast majority to live in a functioning democracy, and that 
membership of the EU was a vital national interest.
After the death of President Franjo Tudjman in November 1999, the demise of 
his government, and parliamentary and presidential elections in early 2000, which 
led to the formation of a coalition government of Social Democrats and liberals 
under former Prime Minister Ivica Racan, Croatia became an exception regarding 
the situation of states of former Yugoslavia. Issues like economy, rule of law, 
functioning of the state administration and civil freedoms superseded others like 
national identity, statehood and sovereignty.
In 2000, the Ivica Racan’s government managed to overcome the international 
isolation of the Tudjamn era, making signifi cant steps in domestic reforms (amending 
the Constitution, changing the political system from a presidential to a parliamentary 
system, transferring most executive presidential powers from the president into 
the institutions of the Parliament and the Prime Minister) and gaining admittance 
to international institutions (became a World Trade Organization member in 
November 2000, signed an association agreement with the EU in October 2001, 
and applied for membership in February 2003). Constitutional changes created 
the conditions for parliamentary and public control of the executive branch of the 
government, especially in terms of the transparency of budgetary issues. As a result 
of democratization, the majority of the media became more professional and NGOs 
took their place within society which resulted in a tremendous improvement in the 
perception of Croatian achievements. Changes in the economic system followed 
but more slowly than expected. The chaotic economic situation needed more than 
 2 Cepanec, Željko – Croatia and Nato.
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administrative measures to recover and to become stable so as to ensure a constant 
and sustainable economic growth. The poorly managed privatization produced a large 
number of politically privileged entrepreneurs whose ability to face open market 
competition was questionable, and almost the same happened to the state owned 
companies. Consequently, a new wave of restrictive measures were introduced 
what, in addition with the reorganization of the economic system at the macro and 
micro level, caused even higher unemployment along with dissatisfaction among 
the people with the government.
The coalition, characterized as highly heterogeneous, soon became rather 
dysfunctional, without a clear direction in the domestic policy and strength to 
follow through diffi cult reforms (Vlahutin, 2003: 25). Too much time was spent 
on intra-coalition bargaining about positions in the government and on fi nding 
adequate people from the respective parties to fi ll the higher posts in state institutions 
which resulted in insuffi cient expertise and slowed down the process of domestic 
changes.
The return of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) to power with Ivo Sanader 
as Prime Minister, in 2003, was not smooth. It raised some concerns about a 
possible resurgence of nationalism. The return to the politics of old elites, corrupt 
networks inherited from the war and clientelistic practices prosper unchecked by 
the judiciary, and nationalist refl exes were still detectable in the persistent tensions 
with neighboring Slovenia over territorial questions.3 But the legacy of democratic 
changes introduced by the previous government of Racan, the moderating infl uence 
of President Stipe Mesic, and constraint imposed by Croatia’s European aspirations, 
have contributed to the transition from hard to soft nationalism.
One strategy of Prime Minister Ivo Sanader was to transform the HDZ from the 
nationalist-populist movement of the 1990s into a party of the conservative right. 
Nationalist forces were supplanted by democratic and modernizing coalitions that 
look forward to a European future. Furthermore, Croatian nationalism has achieved 
some of its goals: the creation of a nation-state controlling all of its territory; has 
embarked on a moderate course that marginalized the radical elements,4 the coalition 
governments attempted to break with the legacies of the Tudjman era. Finally, the 
opposition was democratic and pro-European. The prospect of integration has built 
 3 After a border incident in 2004, Slovenia promptly declared that it would cease to support 
Croatia’s application for EU accession. The relations between Zagreb and Ljubljana had
deteriorated since the 1994 law passed by the Croatian Parliament concerning territorial waters 
and the creation of a Croatian economic exclusion zone in the Adriatic.
 4 Some have left the political stage; others have left the HDZ for small groups with little electoral 
backing, such as the Party of Rights.
Teresa Cierco
 181 Nação e Defesa
a consensus among political groups and citizens around democracy being the basis 
of the country’s political system, which is still important to concretize the political 
and economic reforms that are needed.
The government of Ivo Sanader did not do much to improve the rule of law 
internally, but it has not reversed three major policy shifts inaugurated in the 
post-Tudjamn era that became test issues for the EU’s attitude to Croatia. The fi rst 
was the change of policy towards BiH and the end of Zagreb’s support for HDZ 
nationalist extremists in Herzegovina. The second was the cooperation with the 
ICTY, including the delivery of Croatian military personnel widely seen as heroes. 
Finally, the return of members of the Serbian minority to Croatia, expelled in 1995 
military campaign in the Krajina, was an important change that allowed a better 
relationship between the two communities.5
The EU has played a fundamental role in all this evolution. Acting as the main 
generator of change and reform, offering models, guidelines, and fi nancial assistance 
for reconstruction, development, and transition,6 the EU helped Croatia to succeed 
in its process of transition.
The HDZ government, headed by Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, was narrowly 
re-elected in November 2007,7 and assumed offi ce on January 12, 2008. The Sanader 
government’s priorities remain membership for Croatia in the EU and in NATO, 
what seems to happen in the end of the decade.
In order to provide an evaluation of the internal factors that characterize the 
political development and the promotion of good governance norms in Croatia, we 
will analyze the progress made by the country regarding the Copenhagen political 
and economic criteria. The fi rst one requires stability of institutions guaranteeing 
 5 In early August 1995, the Croatian invasion of Serbian Krajina precipitated the worst refugee 
crisis of the Yugoslav civil war. Within days, more than two hundred thousand Serbs, virtually 
the entire population of Krajina, fl ed their homes, and 14,000 Serbian civilians lost them lives. 
Available at http://www.emperors-clothes.com/articles/elich/krajina.html
 6 Financial assistance is provided under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) from 
2007. The 2007-2009 Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) for Croatia was 
adopted in June 2007. The 2007 IPA national program amounted to 141 million euros. This 
assistance is concentrated on institution building and preparation for the implementation of 
the EU’s common agricultural policy and cohesion policy (European Commission, 2007: 6).
 7 The HDZ-led government that assumed Offi ce in January 2008 represents a coalition agreement 
between the HDZ (66 seats), the HSS (6 seats), the HSLS (2 seats), the SDSS (3 seats), other 
minority representatives and the lone representative of the HSU. The centre-right coalition led 
by HDZ has a majority of 83 seats out of 153. For the fi rst time the eight minority MPs are 
offi cial coalition partners and a member of the Serb party, the SDSS, took one of the Deputy 
Prime Minister posts and became a member of the cabinet (EC, 2008: 7).
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democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. 
The second, the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. The aim of 
this analysis is evaluate the democratic development (electoral process, rule of law, 
civil society, independent media, and judicial system) and the respect of human 
rights in Croatia.
Internal Factors: More Efforts are Needed
The desire to become an EU member has infl uenced the fulfi llment of democratic 
principles of governance in Croatia. The country has been progressing towards 
democracy, incorporating democratic practices in their internal policies. As a result 
of this “good behavior” it has been rewarded with the candidate status in 2004.
In fact, after 2003, the HDZ government has managed to strengthen state 
institutions and maintain internal security better than the previous center-left 
government, but it continues to fall short of expectations in its ability to implement 
macro-level reforms in such areas as the judiciary or to fi ght corruption, which 
remains entrenched in the country’s institutions. These are, in fact, the two most 
complicated issues for the long-term democratization of Croatia, inherited from the 
process of transition and the building of the state during a time of war.
Regarding one of the fi rst indicators of democratization level, the electoral 
process, Croatia met some democratic standards like the OSCE commitments for 
democratic elections. Accordingly to the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe/Offi ce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), 
2007 Parliamentary elections in Croatia were “administered transparently and 
professionally” (OSCE/ODIHR 2008: 1). Also Croatia 2008 Progress Report from 
the European Commission states that “…the elections were free and fair” (EC, 
2008: 6).
The actual legal framework provides overall an adequate basis for the conduct of a 
democratic election process. Previously incomplete aspects of the election legislation, 
which created challenges for the administration bodies, have been addressed by 
the enactment of new laws on the State Election Commission (SEC), voters’ lists, 
and fi nancing of political parties.8 But, although these electoral reforms strengthen 
 8 In 2006 and 2007 these three election-related laws were enacted: the Law on the State Electoral 
Commission of the Republic of Croatia (2006) formally reconstituted the State Election Commission 
(SEC) as a permanent body exercising advisory and administrative functions, in addition to its role
Teresa Cierco
 183 Nação e Defesa
the legal basis for the proper conduct of elections, there are still some constraints 
at this regard. The SEC is already operational at state level but adequate staff has 
not been recruited at the local level (EC, 2008: 7). Effects of the Law on Financing 
of Political Parties will only be evident during 2009 when annual reports are due. 
Furthermore, certain defi cits of democratization are appointed by Freedom House, 
namely shortcomings in the management of voter lists and lack of clarity on how to 
implement provisions of the constitutional Law on National Minorities concerning 
the allocation of reserved seats for minority representatives.
At the decentralization level, the country is still running a large and complicated 
set of regional and local government institutions that are far more expensive 
than effi cient.9 EU pressure to decentralize has resulted in a larger distribution of 
duties and responsibilities but the lack of resources makes impossible its effective 
implementation. At this regard, one important provision was adopted allowing the 
direct election of mayors and zupans (county prefects), making the mayor more 
accountable to people at the local level what may eventually help to improve local 
accountability in general.10
Regarding public administration, some progress has been made. The adoption 
of the Public Administration Reform Strategy for the period 2008-2011 and the 
amendment of the Civil Service Law allow the planned de-politicization but they are
still in an early stage. The legal basis for building a modern and professional civil service
in Croatia is still incomplete. The weak management and administrative capacity 
of institutions in charge of public administration reform remains a reality.
Similar to other countries on the region, the political fi eld in Croatia is too 
fragmented, with an excessive number of political parties (102 offi cially registered).11 
Since the last Croatian governments are the result of coalitions, it is frequent some 
 during elections; the Law on Voters’ Lists (2007) introduced new safeguards to address concerns 
in previous elections that insuffi cient safeguards were in place to control the addition of voter 
lists at the polling stations on election day, raising the potential for multiple voting; the Law 
on the Financing of Political Parties (2006), provides an expanded basis to all monitoring the 
fi nancing of political parties It includes restrictions on the amount and source of contributions 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2008: 4).
 9 Croatia is divided into 20 counties that represent an executive power between national and city 
(or municipal) levels. This is considered by many specialists a territorial and bureaucratic division 
instituted during Tudjam years and has been criticized both domestically and internationally. 
Accordingly to Freedom House report, the power structures between the national level, the 
Zupanija (administrative regions – county) and city levels are highly improvised and easy to 
manipulate (FH, 2009: 3).
10 Until 2006, mayors had been chosen by political parties that won or controlled a majority within 
city parliaments.
11 Available at [http://www.hidra.hr/strankee/501int4.htm].
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political maneuvering within or between parties which led to policy paralysis and 
held up reform in the past. This generates frequent amendments to legal acts and 
diffi culties in its implementation. Also, the use of public sector employment as 
a tool of patronage has led to an overstaffed and ineffi cient public sector. These 
practices negatively impact transparency in public procurement, the development 
of a market economy, and consistency in respecting the law.
One of Croatia’s main challenges is to turn the judicial system into a reliable 
and effi cient one. The excessive amount of time needed to hand down and enforce 
rulings, the overloaded Courts, and the impartiality of the judicial system are some 
of the persistent problems in this area.12 Despite efforts at reform, many local courts 
are much lower than the national standard and continue to produce questionable 
results. Although the adoption of some practical reforms to help effi ciency in 
2007,13 their effects are considered marginal and modest (FH, 2009: 5). According 
to numerous public opinion polls, the judiciary system in Croatia is perceived 
as corrupt. This problematic status is partly a legacy of the 1990s and partly the 
result of attempts by the ruling party to infl uence the appointment of judges and 
the functioning of the courts.
Corruption represents a threat to the stability of democratic institutions and the 
rule of law in all the WB countries, including Croatia. It is the refl ection of lack of 
transparency and accountability in public administration and lack of ethic codes 
of conduct in the public and private sectors. In Croatia, this is one of the most 
problematic areas in the negotiations with the EU. Numerous surveys highlight 
a public perception that corruption has actually gotten worse over the past year, 
is widespread, even at high level, among political parties, in the judiciary,14 with 
representative bodies, and in land registration.15
The government’s efforts at this regard led to the adoption of a National 
Program for the Fight Against Corruption, and several anticorruption policies.16 
12 See FH, 2007: 224, where whole judicial system of Croatia is considered “slow, corrupt and 
often partisan”.
13 During 2007 the government consolidated similar local courts into one larger for better effi ciency 
and to reduce case backlogs. A Code of conduct was adopted for judges, and there have been 
some improvements in making free legal aid more accessible to those who can not pay (FH, 2008:).
14 According to a 2006 survey taken by Zagreb’s Offi ce of Transparency International, more than 
40 percent of complaints from local citizens regarding corruption were connected with the 
judicial system (FH, 2007: 226).
15 Croatia was ranked 64 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2007 
Corruption Perceptions Index (FW, 2009:3).
16 The adoption of the national anticorruption program, the increased penalties and the strengthened 
of the independence and capacities of the special unit USKOK (Offi ce for Fighting Corruption 
and Organized Crime) resulted in successful investigations.
Teresa Cierco
 185 Nação e Defesa
Also, a revised Anti-Corruption Strategy accompanied by an Action Plan (June 
2008) containing specifi c measures in a number of fi elds prone to corruption was 
adopted. Nevertheless, they have not yet yielded visible results. Its implementation 
lacks strong coordination and effi cient non-partisan monitoring (EC, 2008: 9). At this 
regard, Transparency International Croatia states that anticorruption measures have 
been undertaken more to satisfy EU demands than to develop domestic anticorruption 
forces (FH, 2008: 4). The defi cit of accountability is shown in the public perception 
that some groups especially politicians are untouchable by law.
At this regard, accordingly to the European Commission (EC) “there is a need 
for greater efforts to prevent, detect and prosecute corruption” (EC, 2007: 10). Also 
the European Parliament considers unacceptable the “high level of corruption, which 
undermines the economic development of the country”.17
Freedom of expression and information in the media is an essential requirement 
of democracy. In Croatia, the situation in this sector is also similar to the other 
Balkan countries. The pressure and intimidation of journalists is a reality, specially 
to the ones that are reporting on war crimes and other sensitive topics.18 The media 
remains vulnerable to political pressure and several acts of journalist intimidation 
were reported in last years.19
Other domestic factor with an increased importance in the Croatia’s process of 
democratization, is the participation of civil society in public life, which is considered 
a precondition for and a result of effective and legitimate democratic institutions. 
In WB countries, the low participation of society in the defi nition and development 
of public politic results from the lack of confi dence in the institutions, the low process 
of democratization and the negative effects of economic reforms (infl ation, stagnation, 
high unemployment, low purchase capability, corruption). In Croatia, civil society 
and public opinion have become an important element in the decision-making 
process, and internal political pressures are now much more effective that a few 
years ago.
The EU’s fi nancial support to civil society in sectors like environment and 
sustainable development, democratization and human rights and youth, was essential 
to promote a greater involvement of citizens in Croatia’s public life (EC, 2007: 6). 
17 Euroactiv (April 10, 2008) “Croatia progress towards EU”.
18 Threats, assaults and murders of journalists were reported during 2008 (HRW, 2009: 356).
19 Accordingly to the Croatian journalists’ association, the mafi a had massively expanded in 
Croatia, and journalists are frequently target of physical attacks. The murder of journalist Ivo 
Pukanic, the arrest of journalist Peratovic and the murder attempt of journalist Dusana Miljusa 
are some of the examples of the situation. Euroactiv (October 24, 2008) “Murder of top journalist 
exposes Croatia’s mafi a surge”.
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Nevertheless, the legislative framework for civil society is not yet consolidated. 
Civil society organizations continue to have diffi culty infl uencing policy debate 
and remain relatively weak in analytical capacity due to, among other reasons, the 
quality of media, which is considered weak. The participation in democratic life 
requires that the public is well informed and has the possibility of freely discussing 
different opinions, where the media has great responsibilities.
The number of Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) is considerable 
(more than 20,000)20 but, with some exceptions, its influence on government policy 
remains limited.21 The National Foundation for Civil Society Development,22 which 
aims to promote and develop civil society in Croatia, is accused of biased and 
nontransparent procedures in distributing funds to civil associations.23 Official 
financial support is given to cultural, social, and humanitarian associations, but 
public funding is less forthcoming for human rights and civic NGOs, which 
nonetheless play an important role in the democratic evolution of the society. 
According to a survey carried out by the Ivo Pilar Institute, citizens have a 
generally positive perception of NGOs and consider them useful for society.24 
Most of those surveyed feel that associations make a pronounced contribution 
to raising awareness about citizen’s rights and the development of democracy 
in Croatia, but at the same time, feel that they do not contribute much to solve 
concrete existential issues. Croatian citizens are more skeptical of their influence 
on important decisions at the regional (61 percent) and national (63 percent) 
levels (FH, 2007: 218). At this regard, we must not forget that the attitudes and 
20 FH, 2007: 218.
21 One success of NGO performance was the adoption of the amendments that introduced the term 
hate crime into the Croatian Criminal Code in 2006. These amendments were presented by two 
human rights-oriented NGOs – Iskorak and Kontra, and represented a signifi cant step for the 
domestic legal framework. However, they have yet to be put into practice, since many supporting 
laws and regulations have to be changed in order to act on them. Other important actor in Croatia 
civil society is the Catholic Church which has a strong infl uence on both the state and society.
22 The National Foundation for Civil Society Development was founded by a special Act (NN 
173/03) by the Croatian Parliament on 16 October 2003, as a public foundation with the basic 
purpose of promoting and developing the civil society in the Republic of Croatia. In order to 
fulfi ll its basic purpose, the National Foundation offers expert and fi nancial support to programs 
which encourage the sustainability of the not-for-profi t sector, inter-sector cooperation, civil 
initiatives, philanthropy, voluntary work and the improvement of the democratic institutions 
of society. [http://zaklada.civilnodrustvo.hr/index.php?p=eng_o_zakladi&s=31]
23 The adoption of the Code of Good Practice, Standards and Measures for the Realization of 
Financial Support to NGO Programs followed by adoption of the Law on Volunteerism in 2007, 
brought greater transparency in the allocation of State funds for NGOs and further stimulate 
the development of civil society (OSCE, 2007: 4).
24 Ivo Pilar Institute—a comprehensive survey of public attitudes, perception, and understanding 
of NGOs for the Academy for Educational Development, July 2005.
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the assessments of democratic regimes by the citizens themselves are seen as 
important instruments to evaluate the quality of democracy.
Croatia made modest improvements in human rights in the last years. It adopted 
a legal framework that provides the protection of fundamental political civil and 
human rights and equality under law. Nevertheless, reforms are still in an early 
stage. Their implementation and enforcement has been a diffi cult task. A revised 
Action Plan addressing all major reform issues was adopted in June 2008, but in 
certain areas the action plan lacks measurable objectives that will allow effective 
monitoring of its implementation (EC, 2008: 8).25 The positive work of the Human 
Rights Ombudsman was undermined by the frequent failure of national and local 
authorities to respond to its recommendations and information requests (HRW, 
2009: 357).
Another important issue for the stability and democracy of Croatia is interethnic 
relations and the question of minority rights. Although some progress made in 
this area, interethnic relations still constitutes a common and potential source of 
confl ict. Croatia is accused of violations in the right to a fair trial and the length 
of proceedings.26 The implementation of the Constitutional Law on National 
Minorities continues to be slow despite the adoption of an action plan in June 
2008.27 Problems persist particularly in terms of under-representation of minorities 
in state administration, the judiciary and the police. Although some progress 
regarding political representation, clarifi cation is needed on how minority quotas 
should be reached.28 According to European Commission, the Serb minority is 
still discriminated in what concerns the access to employment particularly in the 
public sector (EC, 2008: 13), and there are still obstacles to the reintegration of Serb 
returnees in the country (HRW, 2009: 354). Also the Amnesty International Report 
states that “Croatian Serbs continued to be victims of discrimination in realizing 
some economic and social rights”.29 Furthermore, despite the adoption of a special 
25 Accordingly to Human Rights Watch, the closure of the OSCE Mission in Croatia on December 
2007 created a signifi cant human rights monitoring gap in the country (HRW, 2009: 358). This was 
replaced by an Offi ce in Zagreb. Its functions are available at www.osce.org/zagreb/29459.html.
26 Accordingly to Amnesty International Report “many prosecutions and trials against Serbs remain of 
questionable standard, with concerns relating to fairness – particularly for those tried in absentia or 
prosecuted in areas where the crimes occurred – and about the effectiveness of the court-appointed 
defense lawyers”. Available at [http://amnesty.org/en/region/croatia/report-2008]
27 The Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities guarantees employment of natio-
nal minorities at all levels of public service – including State and local administration, which 
incorporates the police – and the judiciary
28 For the fi rst time, an ethnic Serb has been appointed to one of the Deputy Prime Minister posts 
(EC, 2008: 13).
29 Amnesty International Report. Available at [http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/regions/euro-
pe-and-central-asia/croatia]
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action plan to improve the situation of the Roma minority in the country in 2005, 
this continues to be a problem in terms of access to employment, social protection 
and healthcare. Discriminatory attitudes prevail towards Roma and other vulnerable 
groups (EC, 2008:15).
The full alignment with EU acquis obliged Croatia to adopt an important 
anti-discrimination law in July 2008, but its application is not easy. Accordingly to 
European Commission “the level of protection against discrimination in practice 
and its judicial prosecution is not in line with EU standards” (EC, 2008: 12). The 
European Court of Human Rights continues to condemn Croatia for violation of 
Article 3 – inhuman and degrading treatment concerning prison conditions.30
Croatia adopted in November 2007 and Action Plan for the protection and 
promotion of human rights during 2008-2011, but the enforcement of rights continued 
to negatively affected by shortcomings in the judicial system (EC, 2008:10).
The Croatian judiciary continued to investigate and prosecute war crimes. 
But in the majority of cases criminal proceedings were related to cases where the 
victims were ethnic Croats. There continued to be widespread impunity for crimes 
allegedly committed by members of the Croatian Army and Croatian police forces, 
despite some steps taken to investigate and prosecute war crimes against Croatian 
Serbs.31
Economic and social problems make diffi cult the relations between minorities. 
The Eurofound report reveals that levels of trust and social cohesion are low, with 
a third of Croatians believing that caution is necessary in dealing with others, 35% 
claiming that there are tensions between ethnic groups, and 62% expressing concern 
over tensions between rich and poor.32 Accordingly to a Human Rights Watch 
report,33 violence and tension are still common, particularly in the Lika region, 
northern Dalmatia and western and eastern Slavonia.
Looking to the economic sector, Croatia is in a good position regarding the social 
and economic development, and the future integration into the EU. Accordingly with 
30 A total of 636 new applications to the ECthHR were made during 2008 (EC, 2008: 10). Accor-
dingly to Freedom House report on “Freedom in the World”, prison conditions in Croatia do 
not fully meet international standards due to overcrowding and poor medical care (FH, 2009: 4).
31 Accordingly with the Amnesty International Report, “despite signifi cant developments with 
regard to crimes committed against Croatian Serbs in Osijek, elsewhere in Croatia no meanin-
gful steps were taken to tackle impunity for crimes allegedly committed by members of the 
Croatian Army and police forces”. Available at http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/regions/
europe-and-central-asia/croatia.
32 Euroactiv (27 July 2007) “Croatians pessimistic about future – survey”. Available at [http://
www.euractiv.com/en/opinion/croatians-pessimistic-future-survey/article-165822].
33 Human Rights Watch (September 1, 2006) “Croatia: Plight of Returning Serb Refugees May 
Slow EU bid”. Available at [http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/09/01/croati14114.htm].
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the Copenhagen criteria of 1993, membership in the Union requires the existence of a 
functioning market economy, and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union. This means that candidate’s states like Croatia needs 
to be capable of assuming economic obligations of membership in a way that the single 
market functions smoothly and fairly, and that the economy must have fl exibility and 
suffi cient level of human and physical capital, especially infrastructure.
Knowing that economic development provides a milieu favorable to democracy, 
sustainable internal political stability in the region is primarily dependent on urgently 
needed improvement of economic and social conditions. However, the economies of 
the WB countries have in common two severe legacies: the arrangements of the old 
socialist semi-planned economy and the damaged structures of the war economies 
of the 1990s (Altmann, 2003: 69).
Among these group of countries, Croatia, as well as Montenegro, lead the group 
of the non-EU Balkans countries that are in better position regarding accession 
country average. Its efforts towards ensuring its sustainable development, its fi nancial 
services and network industries, related to the good quality of infrastructure are 
the main reasons appointed by the World Economic Forum for this situation (WEF, 
2008: 12). Macroeconomic policies have, on the whole, been appropriate to contain 
potential external vulnerability.
In general, stability has been maintained (6.8% increase in the GDP in 2007, an 
average infl ation rate of 6.4% in December 2008, and reduced unemployment)34 
and has allowed economic agents to make decisions in a climate of stability and 
predictability, thus supporting the functioning of market mechanisms. Consequently, 
foreign direct investment remains the main source of foreign fi nancing, representing 
7.7% of GDP (EC, 2008: 18). Social exclusion is relatively small, and social disparities 
can be considered moderate comparing with other countries of the region (Altmann, 
2003: 79).
The essential features of a market economy and competition have been achieved, 
but not always the rules are applied. Although the legal framework for a functioning 
private sector exists, there is still a strong state enterprise sector. In this sense, one 
of the priorities established by the European Council to Croatia is “to improve the 
institutional framework for privatization with a view to signifi cantly advancing 
the privatization of companies held under the State Privatization Fund” (European 
Council, 2008: 3).
34 The offi cially registered unemployment rate showed a marked decline from 11.1% in 2006 to 
9.6% in 2007. It declined for all age groups, but still remained high for the young population 
(24%) (EC, 2008: 19).
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Until now, the international fi nancial crisis has only mildly affected the Croatian 
economy and its fi nancial sector. However, its economy is vulnerable to possible 
disruptions in capital fl ows (EC, 2008: 19). Financial and economic ties of Balkan 
countries with the exterior are strait. More than 90% of Croatia Banks are foreign 
institutions with diffi culties. The exportations tend to be low as well as the foreign 
investments.
All these political, social, and economic factors are related and are part of an
important journey that Croatia took in the beginning of this century towards 
democratization and modernization. Legal security, equality before the law, 
transparency and accountability are some of the values for a democratic society.35 
Citizens’ trust in their public institutions is based on such values. Business can 
fl ourish and real competition can develop itself only if the judicial system and the 
public administration are effi cient, impartial, independent and accountable.
The membership of the EU is a common goal in Croatia, and this shared 
commitment has been important to support government’s efforts to meet the accession 
standards which involve sometimes radical but extremely benefi cial reforms. If it 
succeeds, Croatia can show the other countries that the promise of membership is 
real, tangible and, most importantly, within reach.36
External Factors: Decisive Elements in Croatia’s Course Towards the EU
It’s diffi cult to separate domestic policy and foreign policy agenda since internal 
reforms are driven by foreign policy goals, particularly Croatia’s intent to joint the 
35 To be accountable means to have the duty to provide an account: that is, to explain and justify 
one's actions in terms of appropriate criteria and in suffi cient detail. The criteria and level of 
detail that are required depend, of course, on the context. Accountability is, therefore, not the 
same as, though it includes, answerability; that is to say, a duty – which may be legal, political, 
or moral – to respond to questions about a particular matter. The concept of accountability also 
includes liability to some form of sanction if the performance revealed by the account is consi-
dered unsatisfactory. The sanction may be legal or, in a broad sense, political. As I will explain 
later, public criticism can be a signifi cant form of sanction in a democracy. The basic idea of 
transparency is that citizens should easily be able to obtain the information they need in order 
to call public authorities to account, whether at elections, or between elections. At least until 
recently, many modern democracies have tended to assume that suffi cient information would 
emerge as a by-product of the exercise of traditional political freedoms, in particular the freedom 
of expression. This approach can be seen in the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
was adopted just over half a century ago. The Convention affords especially strong protection to 
the Press as regards freedom of expression, because of the role of the Press in imparting infor-
mation and ideas to the public and the right of the public to receive them. Diamandouros, 2006.
36 Delegation of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament to Croatia (Zagreb) 
– 6-7 February 2008.
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EU. In Croatia’s case the most important inductive cause of democratic transition 
was external, not internal. The accession perspective to the EU has been a crucial 
factor in all the process of transition to democracy, and is used to introduce necessary 
democratization changes. However, the current status of negotiations with the 
EU regarding Croatia’s eventual accession is much slower than it was desire and 
expected. So, there is a certain fatigue on the side of Croats regarding the demanded 
reforms, and this can be a problem if the EU does not provide concrete assurance 
of membership (FH, 2007: 216).
WB countries have several dissimilarities regarding the process of membership 
the EU. “Generic Balkan trends also fail to acknowledge the heterogeneity of 
outcomes, ranging from Croatia fulfilling the preconditions for EU accession 
negotiations to other states and entities failing to meet basic European criteria” 
(Van Meurs, 2004).
Thus, these countries present differences in the speed and modalities of the 
political change and some dynamics remain country specifi c. In Croatia’s the 
application for EU membership was an important generator of administrative and 
legislative reform. Since 2003, the HDZ tackled the most sensitive issues, such as 
full cooperation with the ICTY, and the return of refugees. Legislative and executive 
efforts focus on achieving the priorities set out in the European Partnership and 
in fulfi lling the conditions set by the Commission. Thus, Croatian leaders were 
committed to build a strong national consensus in favor of a European reform 
agenda. These efforts cross party lines and involved civil society.
After 2001, the country was determinate to entrench democratic values and made 
progress on the main outstanding political questions, particularly minority rights. 
The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP),37 which provides a framework 
for the developments of relations between the WB countries and the EU, favoring 
their gradual integration into the structures of the Union, was an essential external 
ingredient of Croatia’s change of course, with its policy of differentiation (Vlahutin, 
37 All the members of the EU gave their support to the SAP at the Feira European Council in June 
2000: “The European Council confi rms that its objective remains the fullest possible integration 
of the countries of the region into the political and economic mainstream of Europe through 
the SAP. All the countries concerned are potential candidates for EU membership”. The SAP 
is the EU’s policy framework for the countries of the WB. The main elements of this long-term 
commitment to the region were proposed in a Commission Communication (COM (99)235) of 
26 May 1999. The SAP supports the WB countries’ development and preparations for future EU 
membership by combining three main instruments: the Stabilization and Association Agreements, 
autonomous trade measures and substantial fi nancial assistance. Is a step-by-step approach, 
based on aid, trade preferences, dialogue, technical advice and contractual relations. It also sets 
political and economic conditions, like regional cooperation and the respect of fundamental 
rights.
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2003: 25).38 It brought new dynamics to Croatia’s internal affairs and foreign relations, 
and culminated in the European Commission’s approval of Croatia’s application for 
membership in April 2004, followed in June by the European Council’s decision to 
grant Croatia the status of EU candidate country. Accession negotiations between 
Croatia and the EU were launched in October 2005 after a seven-month postponement 
resulting from Croatia’s failure to meet all of its obligations in cooperation with 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Only with a 
positive assessment from the ICTY Chief Prosecutor, EU-Croatia relations entered a 
new phase with the confi rmation by the Council that the outstanding condition for 
the start of accession negotiations was met. In the same day the Council decided to 
open accession negotiations with Croatia, and agreed that less than full cooperation 
with ICTY at any stage would affect the overall progress of negotiations and could 
be grounds for their suspension.
EU fi nancial assistance under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
(IPA) amounted to 146 million Euros in 2008. This assistance is concentrated on 
institution building and preparation for the implementation of the EU’s common 
agricultural policy and cohesion policy. Also a 3 million Euros grant scheme will 
be launched to civil society projects in sectors for democracy such as transparency 
and accountability of public administration and fi ght against corruption, anti 
discrimination and sustainable development.
During the last years, the EU’s policy of Stabilization and Association has 
contributed critically to the progress achieved in Croatia in promoting stability and 
in bringing the country closer to the Union. After the launch of membership talks, 
Croatia underwent “screening” – an in – depth analysis to conform its legislation 
to that of the EU – before concrete negotiations on each chapter.39 But, although the 
SAP has produced suffi cient progress to validate the overall policy approach, it is 
clearly not enough to allow complacency. Democratic structures and the rule of law 
remain fragile. Organized crime and corruption obstruct economic and democratic 
38 The signifi cance of that huge step forward was emphasized in the speech delivered by the EU 
Commissioner Chris Patten on 29 October when he stated, “The signature of this agreement 
today shows just how far Croatia has come in 22 months. I pay warm tribute to the Croatian 
people for all they have achieved in such a short time. They set the ball of democracy rolling in 
South East Europe two years ago: this agreement shows that their country is moving forward 
at an impressive pace” Statement of Commissioner Chris Patten at the signing ceremony of the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement between EU and Croatia. Available at [http://www.
eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/news/index.htm].
39 Negotiations have been opened on 21 out of 35 chapters and provisionally closed on four 
(science and research, education and culture, enterprise and industrial policy, external relations 
(EC, 2008: 5).
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development alike. Accordingly to the European Commission, the judiciary reform, 
the return of refugees, the respect of minority rights, the fi ght against corruption, 
and the public administration reform, are some of the country’s main challenges 
in the process of joining the EU.40
The perspective of EU membership can be a powerful motor for reform, but it 
does not work alone. Without signifi cant institutional and fi nancial engagement, 
the prospect of membership can easily turn into and empty rhetorical exercise. On 
the other hand, the EU must also remain credible in keeping the promises set out in 
the Thessaloniki summit declaration. If the EU membership does not seem realistic, 
and the benefi ts tangible, that could undermine the government’s motivation for 
pursuing policies and reforms that are still needed in this region like the establishment 
of a secure self-government; foster justice and reconciliation; promote longer-term 
social progress across the region, fi nd mutually acceptable solutions and guarantee 
peaceful coexistence of the main ethnic groups.
Cooperation with the ICTY is one of the most controversial issues in Croatian 
political life. The Croats negative perception of the ICTY and the policy of Croatian 
government to pay the legal fees of Croatian army generals that are being accused 
by the court are seen as two factors that undermine the EU condition of cooperation 
with the ICTY.41 The Tribunal requirements are perceived as highly political and in 
many respects unjust, given Croatia’s defensive role in the war.
The parliamentary consensus reached after the death of President Tudjamn 
produced the Declaration of the Homeland War in 2000, where almost all political 
parties united to declare that the Croatian war was legitimate defense against 
Serbia’s aggression and necessary for the liberation of the country. The relevancy of 
the 2000 Declaration grew when more public attention was given to indictments by 
the ICTY against several highly ranked Croats, currently in custody in The Hague, 
as allegedly involved in a criminal organization led by President Tudjamn that 
aimed at building up a “Greater Croatia”. If these accusations are proved by the 
International Tribunal, we will assist to the shift of an image from “father of the 
nation” to “war criminal” of President Tudjamn what will affect also a large group 
of his close associates, who still hold top political, legal, and economic posts in the 
country. Such a ruling could have a profound effect on the government’s legitimacy 
and the institutions in place today. While the EU remains Croatia’s key political 
point of consensus, this issue could hamper Croatia’s pace of reform.
40 European Commission “EU Partnership with Croatia”. Available at [http://www.delhrv.
ec.europa.eu/en/static/view/id/33].
41 The most notably benefi ciary of these legal costs could be Croatian Army General Ante Goto-
vina, considered a hero by many Croats.
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All the Croatian Army commanders that are now prosecute by the Tribunal 
are regarded by many in Croatia as national heroes, thus creating major popular 
discontent against the external interference of the International Tribunal.42 Also in 
most parties the local leadership has mixed feelings regarding ICTY cooperation. 
During Tudjamn Government, the Tribunal was viewed with suspicion, and there 
was a regime preference for non-cooperation with the court. This policy changed 
only when both the United States and the EU stated that future military and political 
assistance will depend on Croatian government full cooperation with the ICTY. 
Linking cooperation with the Tribunal to integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions 
was a crucial and decisive factor to bring about state compliance in post-Tudjamn 
Croatia. After 2003, a gradual process of reconciliation between the Croatia state 
and the ICTY gained force. Ivo Sanader favored the rapid pursuit of EU and NATO 
membership and saw compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions 
as a means by which Croatia could accelerate membership negotiations with both 
institutions. At this time, the elite consensus in favor of Croatian accession to the 
Union was important to the success of this domestic policy. In fact, EU conditionality 
played an instrumental role in bringing about Croatia cooperation with the ICTY. But 
the ICTY’s dependence upon external coercion leaves a question mark surrounding 
the long-term of this cooperation. In this context, we also can question how “deep” 
the changes that results from external pressures are, on other words, if they reach 
society or not. Use conditionality to infl uence society in general might be considered 
an impossible task, even being broadly supportive of the EU accession process.
Regional cooperation and good neighborly relations form an essential part of 
the process of Croatia’s moving towards the EU. Croatia has participated in the 
transition from the Stability Pact to a more regionally owned framework with the 
South East European Cooperation Process and the Regional Cooperation Council, 
in the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative and the Migration Asylum and Refugees Regional 
Initiative. Croatia is also part of the Energy Community Treaty and the Central 
European Free Trade Agreement.
In Croatia’s course towards the EU, further concrete steps are still needed on 
three external issues: the dispute about the Protected Ecological Fishery Zone (ZERP), 
the Slovenia Croatia border disagreement, and environmental concerns.
ZERP regulates an area of sea in Croatia’s territorial and international waters 
in the Adriatic and came into force at the beginning of this year. According to 
42 General Ante Gotovina, indicted in 2001 by the ICTY, is generally viewed as national hero, as 
he led an operation that ended the war. He is accused of a “joint enterprise” in an effort to 
expel Krajina Serbs from Croatin in 1995 during Operation Storm at the end of the Croatian 
War. He was captured on December 2005.
Teresa Cierco
 195 Nação e Defesa
Croatian authorities, the zone is intended to preserve fi shing stocks and reduce 
pollution. But Italy and Slovenia state that the area has to be shared between the 
three countries in accordance with EU cooperation.
Another complicating factor in Zagreb’s EU hopes is its ongoing border dispute 
with Slovenia. The two countries have been arguing over maritime areas and 
fi shing rights since their independence, which could threaten Slovenia relation 
with Croatia.43
Finally, the application of the Aarhus Convention on public access to environmental 
information and the ratifi cation of the Kyoto Protocol on the reduction of greenhouse 
gases are also two sensitive issues that Croatia needs to fulfi ll. The main conditions 
impose by the EU are the adoption of a clear and transparent procedure in the
environment sector and the implementation of Community environmental legislation.
Ending this part of external factors, it is important to argue that Croatia North 
Atlantic Organization (NATO) membership can benefi t and stimulate Croatia’s 
accession into the EU. Last April (2008), in the Bucharest Summit, Croatia was 
invited to start accession talks with the Alliance. This means that all the NATO 
countries recognized that Croatia has achieved the criteria imposed and emphasized 
by the Alliance for membership that are quite similar to those defended by the EU, 
namely, the importance of free and fair elections, human rights, a market economy, 
relationships with neighboring countries and civilian supervision over the military. 
This constitutes a strong motivating factor for the Croatian Government to proceed 
with the development of political and economic reforms that will conduct the 
country to joint the EU, probably in 2010.44 In this sense, NATO, along with the 
EU, is another international organization who helps to promote democracy and the 
respect for human rights in Europe and in the World.
Conclusion
Since the end of Cold War, the EU has strengthened its international role by 
developing external relations which include a wide range of political, economic, trade, 
43 The border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia concerns small pockets of land along the 
Adriatic coast, which could prove important if they include exclusive rights to deep sea zones. 
Unlike Slovenia, Croatia has a long coastline, prompting Ljubljana to attempt to assert its rights 
as a “geographically disadvantage state”. If the bilateral dispute is not resolved, Slovenia May 
block Croatia’s EU entry. At this regard, please see Euroactiv (January 27, 2009) “Slovenia 
threatens to end Croatia’s EU hopes”. Available at [www.euroactiv.com/en/enlargement/
slovenia-threatens-croatia-eu-hopes/article].
44 As it was reiterated by EU Enlargement Commission Olli Rehn, the EU objective of fi nalizing the 
negotiations with Croatia by the end of 2009, would allow the country to join the Union in 2010.
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humanitarian and diplomatic initiatives refl ecting EU common values and norms. 
Through the Europeanization process, the EU export to WB countries democratic 
values and practices, rule of law, human rights standards and political dialogue, 
which all together constitute the good governance norms. This process of institution 
building and the subsequent absorption of the EU rules (acquis communautaire) 
are fundamental for the gradual and lengthier process of democratization, and 
consequently, the future membership of Croatia in the EU. The Union is thus acting 
as an external actor of democratization, offering the incentives to adopt rules of 
good governance with the enlargement tool, but political change cannot be only 
externally driven. Nevertheless, in this process, the involvement of local actors 
remains the essential factor to foster a real democratic change. The Europeanization 
of institutions and national legislations are not enough to change social, political, 
administrative and judiciary practices. It is up to the local political elite to seize 
the opportunity to democratize and allow the democratic contagion to produce its 
effects at all levels (from the institutional to the civil society one) via real reform 
process of the domestic political system.
After a decade dominated by the logic of war and the politics of radical 
ethno-nationalism, the WB have entered a period of stability and democratization. 
At different speeds and with distinct goals, this group of states embarked upon 
a process of transformation in political, economic, social and security terms. This 
was an enormous challenge in a context where the quest for integration into 
Western organizations, such as the EU or NATO, became a priority. In Croatia, the 
post-communist transition course involved profound changes in governance and 
polity that followed liberal democratic principles. This implied the strengthening 
of the civil society; the reconfi guration of legislative and institutional practices, 
including the development of political parties, and the adaptation of a transparent 
electoral system; and, the gradual liberalization of the economy (economic reforms 
based on privatization and competitive practices). These political and economic 
procedures and practices at the state level were infl uenced by the conditionality 
and opportunities associated with membership in the EU.
Croatia is experiencing an improvement in human rights protection and 
advancement in the democratic standards performance. This tendency emerged 
more clearly since the EU offered the candidate status. The perspective of EU 
membership seems like a worthwhile reward for the country and it has become a 
vital objective for all the political elites. The positive trend in the political reform 
process and the improvement of democratic performance in Croatia since 2000 
confi rm that an eventual membership represents a real incentive to proceed with 
diffi cult domestic political reforms. However, the development has been limited by 
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continued regional instability and by internal structural constraints at the political, 
economic and social levels, what reminds us that the positive political changes are 
not self-sustainable, long-standing and really embedded within the societies.
References
Abramowitz, Morton & Hurlburt, Heather (2002) “Can the EU hack the Balkans? 
A proving ground for Brussels”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81 (5) 2-7.
Altmann, Franz-Lothar (2003) “Regional Economic Problems and Prospects”. In The 
Western Balkans: moving on, Chaillot Paper, n.º 70, Institute for Security Studies.
Agh, A. (1998) The Politics of Central Europe. London: Sage.
Anastasakis Othon (2005) – “The Europeanization of the Balkans”. In Brown Journal 
of World Affairs, Vol. 12 (1), 70.
Balalovska, Kristina (2004) “Between the Balkans and Europe: A study of the 
contemporary transformation of Macedonian identity”, Journal of Contemporary 
European Studies, Vol. 12 (2) 193-214.
Batt, Judy (2004) “Introduction: the stabilization/integration dilemma”. In The Western 
Balkans: moving on, Chaillot Paper, n.º 70, Institute for Security Studies.
Carothers, Thomas (1999) Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve. Washington, 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press.
Cepanec, Željko – CROATIA AND NATO: The Stony Road to Membership. Available 
at http://www.cpi.hr/download/links/hr/3151.pdf
Chandler, David (2003) “European Union and Governance in the Balkans: an unequal 
partnership”, European Balkan Observer, Vol. 1 (2) 5-9.
Diamond, Larry (1999) Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press.
Diamandouros, P. Nikiforos (2005) – Transparency, Accountability, and Democracy in 
the EU. Lecture by the European Ombudsman, Professor P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, 
at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. 
Available at [http://ombudsman.europa.eu/speeches/en/2006-10-17b.htm]
Emerson, Michael & Aydin, Senem & Noutcheva, Gergana & Tocci, Nathalie & 
Vahl, Marius & Youngs, Richard (2005) “The Reluctant Debutante. The European 
Union as Promoter of Democracy in its neighborhood”, CEPS Working Document 
n.º 223, July 2005.
Europeanization Impact on Croatia’s Course to Democracy
Nação e Defesa 198
Euroactiv (July 27, 2007) “Croatians pessimistic about future – survey”. Available 
at [http://www.euractiv.com/en/opinion/croatians-pessimistic-future-survey/
article-165822]
Euroactiv (April 9, 2008) “Croatia says it will do 'whatever it takes' to join EU in 2010”. 
Available at [http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/croatia-takes-join-eu-2010/
article-171488]
Euroactiv (October 24, 2008) “Murder of top journalist exposes Croatia's mafi a 
surge”. Available at [http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/murder-top-
journalist-exposes-croatia-mafi a-surge/article-176645]
European Commission (2007) Croatia 2007 Progress Report, [COM(2007) 663 fi nal], 
Brussels.
European Commission (2006) Communication from the Commission – The Western 
Balkans on the road to the EU: consolidating stability and raising prosperity. [COM 
(2006) 27 fi nal], Brussels.
European Council Decision on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
Accession Partnership with Croatia and Repealing Decisions 2006/145/EC (2008/119/EC).
European Journalist Centre, Media Landscape – Croatia. Available at [http://www.
ejc.net/media_landscape/article/croatia/]
Freedom House (2008) Nations in Transit – Croatia. Available at [http://www.
freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=449&year=2008] 
Gallagher, Tom (2005) The Balkans in the New Millennium: In the Shadow of War and 
Peace. London: Taylor & Francis Routledge.
Gallagher, Tom (2003) The Balkans after the Cold War, From Tyranny to Tragedy. 
London: Routledge. 
Gligorov, Vladimir (2004) “European Partnership with the Balkans”, European Balkan 
Observer, Vol. 2 (1) 2-8.
Grabbe, Heather & Nicolaidis, Kalypso (2000) “Fostering Social inclusion through 
institutional transformation in central and eastern Europe: the role of EU accession 
conditionality”, World Bank Working Paper 39, Washington.
Grabbe, Heather (2003) “Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in 
the EU Accession Process”. In Featherstone, K. & Radaelli, C. (eds) The Politics of 
Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Heiler, Johannes (2002) “Institutions, Civil Society and Nationalism in the Context of 
Democratic Consolidation – Prospects for Democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina”. Peace, 
Teresa Cierco
 199 Nação e Defesa
Confl ict & Development, Braford, December 2002, 17 pp. Available at [http://www.
peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/BosniaDemoc.pdf]
Hettne, Bjorn & Soderbaum, Fredrik (2005). Civilian power or soft imperialism? The 
EU as a global actor and the role of interregional. European Foreign Affairs Review, 
10 (4), 535-552.
Human Rights Watch World Report 2009. Available at [http://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/fi les/reports/wr2009_web.pdf]
Huntington, Samuel (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth 
century. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press.
Jorgensen, Knud Erik (2004). European foreign policy: Conceptualizing the domain. 
In: Walter Carlsnaes, Helen Sjursen & Brian White (Eds.) Contemporary European 
foreign policy. London: Sage Publications, 48-50. 
Judt, T. (1996) A Grand Illusion? An Essay on Europe. New York: Penguin Books.
Koppa, M. (1997) Minorities in Post-Communism Balkans. Athens: Livanis Publications.
Linz, Juan & Stepan, Alfred (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press.
Madzar, Ljubomir (2001) “The interdependence of political democracy and the market 
economy”. In Margaret Blunden & Patrick Burke (eds.) Democratic Reconstruction in 
the Balkans. London: Centre for the Study of Democracy.
Manners, Ian (2002) “Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in Terms?” in 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40 (2) 235-258.
Merkel, Wolfgang (2001) “Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in East-Central 
Europe”. In Pridham, G. & Agh, A. Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in East-Central 
Europe. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
Meurs, Wim van (2003) “The EU and the Balkans: From Stability Process to 
Southeastern Enlargement”, European Balkan Observer, Vol. 1 (1) 4-7.
Missiroli, Antonio (2003) “The European Union: Just a Regional Peacekeeper?”, 
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 8 (4) 493-503.
Montanaro-Jankovski, Lucia (2005) Good cops, bad mobs? EU policies to fi ght transnational 
organized crime in the Western Balkans. EPC Issue Paper n.º 40, October 10, 2005. 
Morlino, Leonardo (2002). The Europeanization of Southern Europe. In: A. Costa 
Pinto & N. S. Teixeira, (eds.), Southern Europe and the making of the European Union 
1945-1980. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 237-260.
Europeanization Impact on Croatia’s Course to Democracy
Nação e Defesa 200
O’Donnell, Guillermo & Schmitter, Philippe (1998) Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press.
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe- OSCE (2006) Review Report 
on Croatia’s Progress in Meeting International commitments since 2001. Available at 
[http://www.osce.org/documents/mc/2006/06/19522_en.pdf]
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe- OSCE Mission to Croatia (2007) 
Status Report n.º 18 on Croatia’s Progress in Meeting International commitments since June 
2006. Available at [http://www.osce.org/documents/mc/2007/07/25707_en.pdf]
OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Report (2008) Republic of 
Croatia Parliamentary Elections 25 November 2007, Warsaw.
Pantev, Plamen (2002) “The Balkans: Historical Origins and Present Dangers of 
Recurring, Ethnic Confl ict on the European Periphery, 1945-2002”, CIAO Case 
Studies, 2002.
Patten, Chris (2000) “A European Vision for the Balkans”, NATO Review, Vol. 48 
(2) Autumn 2000, 13-15.
Petrakos, George (2002) “The Balkans in the new European Economic Space”, Eastern 
European Economics, Vol. 40 (4) 6-30.
Phinnemore, David (2003) “Stabilization and Association Agreements: Europe 
Agreements for the Western Balkans?”, in European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 8 
(1) 77-103.
Pierre, Andrew J. (1999) “De-Balkanizing the Balkans: Security and Stability in 
Southeastern Europe”, United States Institute for Peace Special Report, September 
1999.
Pippan, Christian (2004) “The Rocky Road to Europe: The EU’s Stabilization and 
Association Process for the Western Balkans and the Principle of Conditionality”, 
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 9 (2) 219-245.
Popa, Oana C. (1999) Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Security in Southeast Europe. A 
Multidimensional Perspective. NATO Individual Fellowship, Final Report.
Pridham, Geoffrey & Agh, Attila (2001) Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in 
East-Central Europe. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Radaelli, Claudio M. (2000). Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and 
substantive change. European Integration online Papers (EloP), 4 (8). Available at 
[http\\eiop.or.at\eiop\texte\2000-008a.htm]. Accessed on May 3, 2006.
Teresa Cierco
 201 Nação e Defesa
Rustow, D. (1970) Transitions to Democracy: toward a dynamic model. Comparative 
Politics, April 1970.
Schmitter, Phillipe (1997) “Civil Society East and West”. In Diamond, Larry et al. 
Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. Themes and Perspectives. Baltimore and 
London: John Hopkins University Press.
Siani-Davies, Peter (2003) International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995. London, 
Routledge.
Solana, Javier (2003) A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. 
European Council of 12 December 2003, Brussels.
Solomon, David (2001) Identity Crisis: A briefi ng on Balkans Key Issues. Geneva: Centre 
for Humanitarian Dialogue.
Steil, Ben (1999) “A European New Deal for the Balkans”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78 
(6) 97-8.
Tardy, Thierry & Windmar, Erik (2003) “The EU and Peace Operations”. Geneva: 
GCSP.
“The EU’s Role in Macedonia”, BBC News: World Edition, April 2, 2001. Available 
at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1256788.stm.]
Todorova, M. (1997) Imagining the Balkans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Van Meurs, Wim (2004) Rethinking the Balkans. Incongruities of State and Nation 
Building, Regional Stabilisation and European Integration. Working Paper, Center for 
Applied Policy Research. Munich: Bertelsmann Foundation, Guetersloh. 
Vlahutin, Romana (2003) “The Croatian Exception”. In The Western Balkans: moving 
on, Chaillot Paper, n.º 70, Institute for Security Studies.
Yannis, Alexandros (2002) “The Creation and Politics of International Protectorates 
in the Balkans: Bridges over Trouble Waters”, Journal of International Relations and 
Development Vol. 5 (3) 258-274.
World Economic Forum (2008) “The Lisbon Review 2008: Measuring Europe’s 
Progress in Reform”. Available at [http://www.pressebox.de/attachment/154762/
The_Lisbon_Review_2008_Rankings.pdf]
Europeanization Impact on Croatia’s Course to Democracy
